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Abstract 
We examine the effect of prizes on innovation using data on awards for technological 
development offered by the Royal Agricultural Society of England at annual 
competitions between 1839 and 1939. We find large effects of the prizes on competitive 
entry and we also detect an impact of the prizes on the quality of contemporaneous 
patents, especially when prize categories were set by a strict rotation scheme, thereby 
mitigating the potentially confounding effect that they targeted only “hot” technology 
sectors. Prizes encouraged competition and medals were more important than monetary 
awards. The boost to innovation we observe cannot be explained by the re-direction of 
existing inventive activity.  
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A long-standing argument in the literature on incentives for innovation suggests that prize 
awards can be a powerful mechanism for accelerating technological development (e.g., Polanvyi, 
1944; Wright, 1983; Kremer, 1998; Shavell and Ypersele, 2001; Scotchmer, 2004; Boldrin and 
Levine, 2008; Kremer and Williams, 2009; Chari et al., 2009). Although this literature highlights 
that the welfare effects of targeted technologies are difficult to estimate ex ante, there has been a 
recent resurgence in the use of prizes for spurring innovation in areas considered to be socially 
and economically important. Most notably the X-Prize Foundation awarded a $10 million prize 
for suborbital spaceflight in 2004, followed by a $10 million prize for rapid human genome 
sequencing,  the  $30  million  Google moon challenge, and inducements for clean-tech and 
medical related solutions. NASA has sponsored prizes for technological innovation since 2004 
and several other governmental prize challenges, or advance market commitments, have been 
announced (Kalil, 2006). A pioneering venture fund, Prize Capital, has sought to use contests to 
generate investment opportunities. A recent report by the National Research Council (2007) 
urged the National Science Foundation to begin an inducement prize program. 
The economic theory of prizes rests on limited historical case studies. For example, Kremer 
(1998) cites the 1839 decision by the French government to purchase the Daguerreotype 
photography patent as evidence that patent buyouts can work. A 1714 prize offered by the British 
government for an instrument measuring longitude is often referenced to highlight the benefits 
and pitfalls of a reward system. The substantial prize of £20,000 offered under a special Act of 
Parliament encouraged competition and technological development. However, John Harrison, 
who solved the navigational problem during the 1750s after decades of experimentation, had to 
wait until 1773 for his prize to be partially paid up following an acrimonious dispute over the 
conditions of the award (Sobel, 1996). Individual case studies, while illuminating, leave open the 
question of whether prizes can be systematically used to stimulate innovation. The National 
Research Council lamented: “owing to the limited experience with innovation prizes, relatively 
little is known about how they work in practice or how effective they may be” (2007, p. 11). 
We address this gap in our understanding using a unique data set of prizes awarded for 
inventiveness by the Royal Agricultural Society of England (hereafter RASE) between 1839 and 
1939. Founded in 1838 to stimulate agricultural progress through “practice with science,” and 
obtaining a Royal Charter of Incorporation in 1840, the RASE became one of England’s most 3 
 
influential scientific societies. A founding objective was “by the distribution of prizes and any 
other mode of expending a part of the resources of the Society, to encourage men of science to 
exert themselves in the improvement of agricultural implements” (Goddard, 1988, p. 26). From 
1839, the RASE held prize competitions at each of its annual national shows. It awarded both 
substantial monetary prizes (totaling in excess of £1 million in current prices) and its own highly 
prestigious medals for innovative implements and machinery. Between 1839 and 1939, 15,032 
entrant inventions competed for the prizes and a total of 1,986 awards were made.
1 
From the records of the RASE, we compiled details on all the entrants and prize winners. 
We collected as well the prize schedules for all available show years. Each year the RASE 
decided which technological areas it wanted to target and the number and value of prizes to be 
awarded. This schedule of prizes was announced ex ante, one year before each show. The RASE 
was also aware that important innovations might come along entirely unexpectedly and the 
judges were therefore given discretion to award additional ex post  prizes.  Some types of 
agricultural machinery were more in need of improvement, so the RASE targeted those areas by 
offering more and higher-valued prizes. Competitions were practical and the inventions entered 
were assessed scientifically by RASE engineers. For example, harvesting machines were tested 
on a local, working farm. Judges authorized the payment of awards. 
Prizes and patents may simultaneously generate incentives for innovation (Wright, 1983; 
Shavell and Ypersele, 2001). Because inventors could pursue both patents and prizes, we 
assembled a data set of all British patents from 1839 to 1939 and matched these against our 
entrants, prize winners and prize schedules. We complemented existing databases of patents with 
our own data collected from records of the British Patent Office. Thus, we were able to identify 
all granted patents during the period 1839-1939.
2 We also identified patents for which renewal 
fees were paid to quality-adjust our patent counts. Renewal fees provide an indicator of patent 
quality on the assumption that renewed patents have a higher value than those that were allowed 
to lapse  (e.g.,  Schankerman and Pakes,  1986;  Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam, 1996). This 
enhances our ability to measure inventive output accurately. 
                                                 
1 The prize competitions restarted after World War II, and indeed are still running today, but only on a much more 
restricted scale than previously. Hence we confine our analysis to the 1839-1939 period, when the prize 
competitions constituted a more prominent part of the activities of the RASE. 
2  British patents were officially sealed as opposed to being “granted,” but we use the latter term for convenience. 4 
 
Our empirical strategy for identifying whether, and how, these prizes affected innovation 
proceeds in three stages. First, we examine entrants for the prizes. One metric of a prize 
program’s impact is the number of contestants that it attracts (NRC, 2007, p.39). Although entry 
is not synonymous with innovation, if prizes encourage competition and more intensive effort on 
technological development, this provides one mechanism through which a boost to innovation 
can  occur.  The RASE used money and medal  prizes as inducements,  so we examine the 
contribution of each to the level of entry.  We estimate that the largest entrant effect came from 
the RASE gold medal, 16 of which were announced and 13 awarded in the years covered by our 
data set. Spurious entries were discouraged using entry fees for non-members of the Society, 
which were refunded if the entry were judged to be genuinely novel (whether or not the machine 
actually worked or won a prize). The shows attracted a considerable degree of interest and the 
machinery could be inspected by the public, thereby enhancing the diffusion of technological 
knowledge. Between 1853 and 1939 the shows drew almost 9 million attendees, with the single 
most popular show being Manchester in 1897, which attracted 217,980 visitors. 
Second, we examine whether the prizes provided a boost to innovation. We determine 
which inventions exhibited at the shows were patented and when the patent application occurred. 
Our objective is to test for identifying variance in the data with respect to output effects so that 
we can estimate the impact of prize awards on aggregate innovation. We find that around a fifth 
of the 15,032 entrant inventions were patented, which corresponds closely to the proportion of 
“mechanical” technologies patented at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 (Moser, 2005). 
Crucially, we find that the largest spike in patenting for inventors occurred in the year of the 
show (i.e., approximately a year after the prizes were announced), suggesting that the 
relationship between prizes and patenting was quite immediate.  We use this finding on the 
timing of patenting to identify the effects of prizes on technological development. If prizes spur 
innovation, then we should observe an effect of prize awards on aggregate contemporaneous 
patenting activity. The English rubric for recording patents – on the basis of their application 
date – links the timing of patents very closely to the timing of inventions and thus gives temporal 
precision to our measurement (see appendix one for further discussion). Organizing the patents 
and prizes into technology categories, we focus on within-category variation in patent counts 
conditional on the award of prizes. We detect statistically significant effects of monetary and 
medal awards and we show that medal awards had the largest effect on patenting activity.  5 
 
Since both our entrant and patent results could be driven by the assignment of prizes to 
“hot” technology sectors, we exploit a prize rotation system used by the RASE between 1856 
and 1872 to mitigate any bias. Following the success of the early shows and the growing number 
of entrants for prizes, the RASE spread trials for different categories of farm implements over a 
number of years. In 1855 a triennial system was established in the schedule, which rotated prize 
awards between implements for tillage and drainage; machines for the cultivation and harvesting 
of crops; and machines for preparing crops for market and food for cattle. An attractive feature 
of these rotating ex ante prizes econometrically is that they are not driven by any demand or 
supply shocks to innovation because they were announced independently of any cycles of 
invention (Scott Watson, 1939, p.94; Goddard, 1988, p.55). That is, it is improbable that the 
rhythm of invention cycles between 1856 and 1872 happened to match the rhythm of the prize 
rotation scheme laid down in 1855.
3 We find that our results are robust to the years when the 
rotation system operated. In fact, we find even larger effects of monetary prizes and a gold medal 
in our entrant and patent regressions during these years, which suggests that giving longer lead 
times to inventors raised the number of competition entries and the intensity of innovation. 
Third, we analyze the extent to which the boost to innovation that we observe  can be 
explained by the re-direction of existing inventive activity. Prizes can lead to an increase in 
aggregate innovative output, or simply incentivize inventors to substitute from one technology 
category to another. This latter effect may have been particularly strong during the rotation 
period when inventors had some advance warning of the technology category that prizes would 
be announced in.  
Our sample of entrants, prize winners and patentees is large enough that we can observe 
repeat inventors and the frequency of their cross-technology category substitution. We show that 
the odds of switching, conditional upon a prize being announced in the schedule, are statistically 
insignificant for entrants and prize winners and for inventors who did not enter into the RASE 
competitions but who did patent in agricultural related areas. Furthermore, when we re-run our 
patent and renewal regressions in the prize rotation period on this latter group of non-entrants, 
we still detect statistically and economically significant effects of monetary and gold medal 
                                                 
3 Towards the end of the period of rotating prizes the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England lamented 
exactly this fact and the  rotation system was subsequently abandoned. A general report on the exhibition of 
implements in the JRASE noted in 1868: “Because it is not their special year of the trial, it is no valid reason why a 
Society like ours should wait for probably two years before it announces improvement[s] to the public. The Society 
ought rather to be on the ‘look out’ for advanced movements and should be first to herald them forth (p.461).” 6 
 
prizes on patenting. This finding is consistent with the prizes  signaling  important  areas of 
technological development to a broad base of inventors.   
Taken together,  our results suggest  that  prizes  can  be an important inducement for 
innovation. The contests organized by the RASE attracted large numbers of inventors and the 
competitions as public events encouraged the diffusion of useful knowledge across innovators. 
Competitive entry is associated with patenting activity in the priority areas. While the monetary 
awards did not offset all the costs of technological development (they covered on average only 
around one-third of the sale price of a single unit of an implement or machine exhibited by a 
successful entrant) winning a prize conferred additional intangible benefits, or a certification 
effect. Inventors were bestowed with “the Society’s mark of approval,” which was a powerful 
form of advertising (Jenkins, 1878, p.870). Although the shows were costly to organize, our 
evidence suggests they were associated with significant output effects. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we sketch out the 
historical background to the RASE prize system. Section three describes the construction of our 
data set. Section four outlines the main empirical specifications and section five presents the 
results. Section six presents the results of tests for the re-direction of inventive activity. Section 
seven concludes with some caveats to our analysis and a discussion of how our findings can 
inform the design of current inducement prize contests. 
 
2. Scientific Societies, Prizes and Patents 
Debate surrounds the role of learned societies in the accumulation of scientific and 
technological knowledge. In Britain alone, by 1850 there were 1,020 scientific societies or 
associations with approximately 200,000 members (Mokyr, 2002, pp. 43-45, 66). Yet, the link 
between these scientific institutions and the progress of innovation may not have been causal. 
Lerner (1992) argues in his analysis of agricultural progress between 1660 and 1780 that 
causality ran the other way. The scientific experiments of the Royal Society (founded in 1660) 
and the Society of Arts (founded in 1754) were infrequent and haphazard in areas related to 
agriculture, while few Royal Society members engaged in agricultural patenting.  
The RASE was able to learn from its antecedent institutions. Whereas its predecessors were 
distracted by politics, which hampered their ability to focus on the technical and scientific 
aspects of innovation, the RASE was a politically agnostic organization. In offering prizes for 7 
 
inventiveness, the RASE followed the Society of Arts, which also awarded premiums for radical 
agricultural improvements.
4 However, the RASE moved beyond the Society of Arts by designing 
a prize system that was more conducive to the dissemination of agricultural science, principally 
through the use of the rigorous competitions.
5 The founding members of the RASE considered 
that agricultural productivity needed to be stimulated at a time when industrial growth was at an 
all-time high (Scott Watson, 1939; Goddard, 1988, p. 26).
6 
Although the prize award system was modified over time, it maintained a common 
structure. After the first few shows a schedule of prizes was set up each year and announced to 
the public one year in advance of the annual show. Farmers and the public attached a growing 
significance to the prizes and by the mid-1850s the number of entrants exceeded the limit of 
what the RASE could subject to a technical trial. Consequently, a triennial rotation system was 
introduced.
7  This  allowed the RASE to focus its efforts on a scientific assessment of 
technologies in a single category each year  and  it gave innovators longer lead times.
8  The 
downside of rotation was that it treated different kinds of innovation in a largely equal manner. 
By the 1870s,  the RASE reported  that technological development in certain categories had 
reached a plateau, which it partly attributed to the system of rotating prizes. Strict rotation was 
abandoned in favor of targeting technology areas (Scott Watson, 1939; Goddard, 1988). 
The RASE altered the value of the prizes within technology categories to spur innovation 
and change the direction of technological development. For example, after awarding an ex post 
prize of a gold medal at the Crystal Palace Exhibition to the American, Cyrus McCormick, for 
his reaping machinery, the RASE offered a series of prizes for cumulative improvements in 
harvesting technology to address the problem that American reapers were far superior to their 
English counterparts. A representative of the RASE was sent to the Philadelphia Exhibition of 
1876 and noted that McCormick’s harvesting machines had advanced to the point where cut corn 
                                                 
4 Between 1754 and 1776, £3,248 in bounties and premia were paid out by the Society of Arts (Lerner, 1992, p. 26). 
5 The RASE offered prizes also for livestock, with in excess of 190,000 entries at the shows between 1839 and 1939. 
6 While growth in industry and agriculture were both flatter than was once believed (Crafts, 1985; Clark, 2002; 
Antràs and Voth, 2003), this does not detract from the key innovations that the RASE sought to advance. 
7 Rotating prizes began with implements for tillage and drainage, then machines for the cultivation and harvesting of 
crops in the following year, and then machines for preparing crops for market and food for cattle in a third year. 
8 We would therefore expect the response of innovators to prizes to be more marked in the period in which the 
rotation scheme was in operation. 8 
 
could be automatically bound. Subsequent competitions were announced by the RASE in an 
effort to improve reapers and close the transatlantic technology gap (see also David, 1971).
9 
The trials that the RASE organized were elaborate and stringent. Judges and consulting 
engineers set up tests that were scientifically evaluated. Reaping machines were tested on farms 
during the summer harvest to see how effectively they could work with British crops. At horse 
plow trials, a dynamometer – an instrument invented by the RASE consulting engineer expressly 
for the competition – was used to test the amount of draft required to pull each of the plows, as 
well as timings being taken to see how long it took the plow team to work a certain area of land. 
In 1856, the Society offered a substantial prize of £500 for “the steam cultivator which shall in 
the most efficient manner turn over the soil and be an economical substitute for the plough or the 
spade”. These machines were judged against the time and labor it would take to plow an area 
with a horse. At a traction engine trial in 1871 a 3,168 yard course was set out with rough and 
uneven terrain with “ugly dips and circuitous lines to render the competition as severe as 
possible”. Trials were expensive to operate. In 1878 it was estimated that the trials cost £2,000 
per annum (Jenkins, 1878, p. 871-872), while in 1920 the tractor trials alone cost the Society 
almost £5,000 (Scott Watson, 1939, p. 102).
10 Following each set of trials, the judges wrote up a 
detailed report on the inventions in the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England. 
From 1847 onwards, the trials were closed affairs that were opened to the public only after 
the judges had completed their evaluations. This made monitoring easier and prevented 
chicanery. A further feature of the trials was that inventors were given the opportunity to inspect 
the machines of larger manufacturers in the hope of encouraging technological spillovers, as well 
as licensing or royalty agreements for the use of inventions that had been patented (Scott 
Watson, 1939, p. 85). Losing intellectual property rights as a result of exhibiting unpatented 
inventions at the shows was assuaged by the Protection of Inventions Act of 1851, which was 
passed in response to the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace. Inventors could display at 
                                                 
9 The RASE reacted with the offer of a gold medal at Liverpool in 1877 for a sheaf-binding machine. The judges 
concluded after a field trial that the prize should be withheld because none of the machines was sufficiently effective 
to warrant the award, including the McCormick entry. So the competition remained open until 1878, when the gold 
medal was awarded at the Bristol show to an improved McCormick machine (Scott Watson, 1939, pp. 84-96). 
10 In fact, the cost of the trials was a very considerable burden on the finances of the RASE, whose only sources of 
income were the annual subscriptions paid by its members and the gate money arising from the annual show. Cost 
was a major reason that the number of competitions had to be scaled back in later years. 9 
 
exhibitions without invalidating their patenting claim to novelty (Van Dulken, 1999, p.21).
11 
Also, inventors were permitted to enter into competition innovations that had already been 
patented or had a patent application pending.  
The prize awards were not designed to be a substitute for patenting, although they did act as 
an antidote to some of the British patent system’s more negative effects.
12 British patent fees 
were the highest in the world. By the middle of the nineteenth century, rolling in extraneous 
expenses, a patent could cost £120 in England and as much as £350 in Scotland and Ireland 
(Macleod, 1988, p.76). While initial fees were progressively reduced by Acts of Parliament (in 
particular in 1883, when they were set at just 16 percent of their 1852 level), in 1925, it was still 
ten times more expensive to carry a patent to full term in Britain than in the United States 
(Lerner, 2002). The Society’s prizes, on the other hand, were open to all. Prizes were awarded 
meritocratically, as established manufacturers complained about entry by newcomers (Goddard, 
1988, p.109). For example, in 1855 dissenting manufacturers authored a report stating: “We 
object to this system [of prizes] on the ground that it operates as an undue stimulus to 
competition.”
13 In 1856 one manufacturer commented on the apparent “destructive” side of the 
prize competitions: “It is unfair because… there will always be sure to be somebody trying to 
find out some improvement or other and there is no knowing where will be the end to it.”
14 
 
3. The Data 
Although the topic of prizes was debated by the Royal Society of Arts in 1856 and 1862, the 
RASE never analyzed the effectiveness of the prize system. While some commentators at RSA 
debates argued that it was difficult to establish a causal link between inducement prizes and 
innovation, citing additionally the case of the Crystal Palace Exhibition, many participants in the 
discussion were more optimistic about their influence (Hoskyns, 1856; Sidney, 1862). J.A. 
Ransome, a leading implement manufacturer,  argued that the prizes “enabled the makers of 
implements in every district to profit by the examples of the best implements... [which] have 
                                                 
11 This was a crucial piece of legislation. In a well-known historical case, James Hargreaves, the inventor of the 
spinning jenny, was denied patent rights by the courts in 1785 because he had sold jennies before applying for his 
patent. Two conditions needed to be met for the law to protect unpatented inventions exhibited at shows: the 
exhibitor had to inform the comptroller of patents of his/her intention to exhibit and the application for a patent on 
the exhibited invention had to be made within six months of the show date. 
12  Khan (2005) argues that the expense of obtaining a patent in Britain undermined democratic invention by 
removing intellectual property rights from all but the economic elite. 
13 Newton’s London Journal of Arts and Sciences, August 1, 1860, p.66. 
14 British Farmer’s Magazine vol. 24., 1856, p.205. 10 
 
become more generally diffused” (Hoskyns, 1856, p. 284). In the remainder of this paper we 
undertake the first quantitative study of the prize system, using data on prizes and patents. 
 
3.1 Entrants, Winners and the Prize Schedule 
We collected three data series from the records of the RASE: those who entered machinery 
or implements into a competition; those who were awarded prizes in a competition; and the prize 
schedule for competitions that was announced by the RASE one year prior to each show. Entrant 
information was taken from the RASE exhibition catalogues, where a typical observation would 
give the name of the entrant, a description of the technology being exhibited and the stand 
number where the inventor was located at the show.
15 Prize winners were announced at the 
shows and were also listed in the main publication of the RASE, the Journal of the Royal 
Agricultural Society of England. The prize winner was named along with their implement, or 
machine, as well at the monetary value of the prize amount, or medal awarded.
16 
In the same publication, the prize schedule was announced. The rubric of the prize schedule 
states  the conditions of the awards: “The prizes are open to general competition; Members 
having the privilege of a free entry; while non-subscribers are allowed to compete on the 
payment of a fee of 5s. on each certificate”. Entrants applied for certificates by writing to RASE 
headquarters in Hanover Square, London. The prizes were listed underneath these instructions.
17 
The RASE generally funded the awards itself, although in some cases individual donors did so.
18  
We collected data on each of the 98 shows between 1839 and 1939 (there was no show in 
1866 due to cattle plague or in 1917 or 1918 due to the First World War), compiling information 
on 15,032 entrant inventions and a total of 1,986 award-winning inventions. Due to missing prize 
schedules for certain years, we were able to match up 91 years of entrants, winners and prizes 
offered.
19 In order to facilitate a comparison of the entrants, winners and awards over time, we 
                                                 
15 For example, a listing from 1844 reads: “Stand No. 26. - Mr William Cambridge, Market Lavington, Devizes, 
Wiltshire 3.5 horse power portable steam engine with shafts complete for traveling.” 
16  For example, a listing from 1853 reads: “William Ball, of Rothwell, Northamptonshire, for his plough best 
adapted for deep ploughing. Seven Sovereigns.” 
17 For example, part of one schedule reads: “For the best portable or fixed steam engine, applicable to thrashing and 
other agricultural purposes. Fifty Sovereigns. For the best drain plough, to cut at one, two, or three cuts, to the 
greatest depth, with not more than four horses, so as to prepare a drain so far for deeper cutting. Twenty five 
Sovereigns.” 
18 For example, Robert Aglionby Slaney Esq., Member of Parliament, announced through the RASE in 1850 the 
offer of two prizes of 10 sovereigns each for drain ploughs. 
19 The schedule of prizes announced is missing for the years 1845, 1851 (due to the Crystal Palace Exhibition), 
1854, 1857, 1862, 1925, and 1939. 11 
 
grouped the inventions that were exhibited and entered into competitions into twelve technology 
categories. These are described in Appendix two. 
Descriptive evidence highlights key aspects of the competitions. The shows were organized 
by the RASE in a different national location each year. Shows were held in a mixture of rural 
and urban districts because trials could be more easily set up in rural locations, whereas 
manufacturing districts attracted larger numbers of visitors and were generally more profitable. 
The first show in 1839 was held in Oxford because of its central location in the country and 
subsequent shows were held in places easily accessible by railway for the benefit of visitors and 
exhibitors. Once a particular district had been announced by the RASE as the location for a 
show, towns within that district competed with one another for the official nomination (Goddard, 
1988, p. 33). The RASE returned to some towns multiple times between 1839 and 1939, such as 
the six shows held in Newcastle Upon Tyne in the years 1846, 1864, 1887, 1908, 1923 and 1935. 
Figure 1 illustrates that prize winners and the shows were geographically dispersed. British 
nationals constituted 98 percent of the prize winners, although the prize schedule was announced 
also in foreign countries through publications such as the Scientific American (see, for example, 
5th May 1894, p. 277). Foreign entrants were more common in later years, when the real cost of 
transport was much lower.
20 Within Britain, there was no local bias in the awarding of prizes.
21 
The average winner lived 114 miles from the show at which they won their award and just 1.5 
percent of the winners were co-located with the awarding show. Although each show was 
smaller than the Great Exhibition, which attracted 6 million visitors (Moser, 2005, p.1224), even 
the smallest show at Park Royal in London in 1905 attracted almost 24,000 visitors, while the 
median number of attendees at the shows on which we have data was 100,000. The size of the 
shows meant around 400,000 implements were exhibited in total, with about 2-3 percent of these 
being considered sufficiently technologically important to be entered into the prize contests. 
Summary statistics on the prizes are given in Table 1. Of particular note is the fact that the 
value of the monetary prizes on offer was more than the value actually awarded. Judges 
conferred a prize only if the scientific criteria for winning were met. This sparked further interest 
by the participants and elevated the reputation of the awards. The monetary prizes, although 
substantial, certainly did not fully cover the average costs of development. To illustrate this, we 
                                                 
20 Three out of thirteen gold medals were awarded to foreigners – two to McCormick for their reapers and one to the 
Swede Knut Ivar Lindstrom for his dairy machine. 
21 The shows moved regularly and the judges were chosen by the RASE independently of geography. 12 
 
collected the RASE’s estimate of the price for which the exhibited implement would be offered 
for sale, which is available in the catalogues for 662 award winners. Figure 2 plots the prize 
awards against the sale prices of the winning implements, revealing a slope coefficient of 0.34. 
Although measurement error in the RASE price estimates will bias the coefficient downwards, 
the fact that the prize value was significantly less than the value of the exhibit is supported by 
records from the shows. A report of the stewards of implements for 1848 states that, “the 
implement makers are unanimous in declaring that, even when successful, the prizes they receive 
do not reimburse them for their expenses and loss of time” (Jenkins, 1878, p.870).
22 
Interestingly, entrants were also attracted to purely non-pecuniary prize competitions by the 
offer of medals. Part of the payoff to entrants came in the form of free advertising that entry (and 
particularly winning) conferred on the invention. The most prestigious award was the RASE’s 
gold medal, which was used selectively. Six of the 16 gold medals announced in our prize 
schedule data were for harvesting machinery, an area in which productivity differences between 
British and American agriculture were especially pronounced (David, 1971). Figure 3 shows the 
impact of these gold medal announcements on the number of competition entries. There was an 
especially large spike coinciding with the first medal, offered for “the best system for drying 
corn and hay in wet weather”. As with monetary awards, the RASE awarded fewer gold medals 
than it announced (Table 1). The reverse was true for silver medals, with 205 announced in the 
schedule but 498  awarded, the additional ones being through ex post  prizes to contestants. 
Bronze medals were announced in the RASE prize schedule but never actually awarded. Over 
time, with growing constraints on the financial resources of the RASE, medal awards became 
more common than monetary awards. This trend is illustrated in Figure 4.
23 
 
3.2 Patents and Renewal Fees 
Since a key objective of our analysis is to determine whether prizes induce innovation, we 
collected patent data.
24 While patents have their limitations, they are a well-documented output 
measure of innovation (Griliches, 1990). They are especially useful when the raw patent counts 
                                                 
22 At the mid-point of our study (1890) the mean prize of £50 would be worth around £4,000 at today’s prices; and 
one of the top prizes of £500 (awarded in 1858) would be worth £37,000. 
23 The largest number of prize contests occurred in the early years, peaking at 28 in 1850. The RASE scaled back in 
later years to conserve its budget. There were approximately 5-10 awards on offer each year from 1870 to 1939. 
24 Beyond patenting, we also cross tabulated our dataset of inventions against Schmookler’s (1966, pp. 282-293) list 
of important mechanical inventions in agriculture. We found that almost two-thirds (63 percent) of Schmookler’s 
inventions are in our data, suggesting that high-quality inventions were entered into the RASE competitions. 13 
 
can be quality adjusted, as we do with our data using the renewal fees discussed below. We 
assembled patents for the period 1839 to 1939 from two existing databases. The first is “A 
Cradle of Inventions” (hereafter COI), which contains all British patent applications from 1617 
to 1893. The second is the European Patent Office Database (hereafter EPO), which contains 
British patents granted from 1894 to the present.
25  
The COI dataset is a composite of various British Patent Office records. Bennet Woodcroft, 
the celebrated first Superintendent of Patent Specifications and Indexes and later Clerk to the 
Commissioners, put together and published lists of all patentees and their inventions from March 
1617 to October 1852. Woodcroft worked with the “fine” copies of granted patents stored in the 
various Chancery Rolls and other old records of government. The compilers of COI then 
appended to this data all patent applications from 1852 to 1893, but for these years they did not 
distinguish between patent applications and patent grants. We therefore hand entered from the 
various journals of the British Patent Office over 170,000 patents that were granted between 
1852 and 1893 in order to make the dataset consistent for our purposes. The net result is a data 
set of over 900,000 British patents that were granted between 1839 and 1939. Our series is 
presented in Figure 5. This shows the large effect of the 1883 Act, which reduced the costs of 
obtaining a patent, as well as the large dip in patenting during the First World War. 
We next proceeded to check the inventions of our entrants and prize winners against the 
COI and EPO data in order to determine whether the technologies exhibited were patented. An 
advantage of the British patent system is that innovations keep their application number 
throughout their life cycle. When an application is granted, perhaps 6 to 12 months after filing, 
that same number is referenced and the number is referenced again when renewal fees are paid, 
or when the patent lapses. Observing patents from their filing point is especially useful for our 
purposes because we are interested in the timing of the patent with respect to the invention being 
exhibited at a show. We matched by hand the names of inventors and the titles of their inventions 
in the RASE dataset and the dataset of patents. This allowed us to establish matches such as: 
 
Thomas Huckvale, of Over-Norton, Oxfordshire, for his horse-hoe with revolving 
blades for thinning turnips [from the prize winning announcement at the 1841 
show in Liverpool]  
 
                                                 




Thomas Huckvale, Horse hoes, and apparatus for treating and dressing turnips, to 
preserve them from insects [title of patent, September, 20th 1841] 
 
Huckvale applied for a patent, which was subsequently granted, in September 1841 – the same 
year as the show at which he won his award. In the case of Thomas Huckvale, the matching is 
straightforward because the patenting year and the exhibition year are the same. But our search 
was conducted independently of the show date, so we are not limited to cases such as this.  
Table 1 presents data on the patenting activity of winners and entrants. We find that 22 
percent of prize winners and 17 percent of entrants who did not win prizes successfully patented 
the invention that they exhibited. The patenting share for prize winners jumps to 28 percent when 
we add observations that we could not match ourselves but for which a mention of patenting was 
made in the prize award records.
26 Figure 6 plots the time series for our conservative estimates, 
with vertical lines reflecting major changes in the patent laws.
27 Changes in the cost of obtaining 
a patent after 1883 had a large positive effect on aggregate patenting (Figure 5), but a smaller 
effect in Figure 6, which may be related to the 1880s agricultural depression.   
Since our econometric exercise requires an output measure of innovation in the areas in 
which prizes were awarded, we took the additional step of matching our patent data to the 
technology categories that we describe in Appendix two. Rather than relying on an imperfect 
concordance between our categories and the subject classes of the British Patent Office, we 
followed the more direct approach of Bennet Woodcroft. In his compilation of a subject matter 
index of patents from 1617 to 1852, Woodcroft used keywords from the title of patents for 
allocation purposes. We perform the same exercise for all of our patents using keywords and 
Boolean operators organizing 130 sub-categories into 12 main technology categories. A more 
detailed discussion of our methodology is presented in Appendix three. 
Finally, we compiled data on the quality of inventions using renewal fees. Renewal fees 
were charged by the British Patent Office to keep the patent term open. Schankerman and Pakes 
                                                 
26 Sometimes the entries in the RASE prize award records specify that the invention was “patented”. However, this 
could mean that an application was simply in process. Given that we are unsure whether these patents were 
subsequently granted, we prefer not to use this incomplete information and instead use our measure that cross 
references inventor exhibits with our patent database. Furthermore, relying on this measure would introduce a 
selection bias in the propensity to patent because such data are not available for all non-winners. 
27 In 1852 the cost of a patent excluding expenses was reduced from £100 with no renewal fees to £25 with £150 in 
renewal fees over the life of the patent. In 1883 the application fee was reduced to £4. (Van Dulken, 1999, p. 24). 15 
 
(1986, p.1052) point out that “if it is assumed that agents make renewal decisions based on the 
value of the patent right obtained by renewal, then data on patent renewals and renewal fee 
schedules contain information on the distribution of the value of patent rights”. Macleod, et al. 
(2003) argue that because credit-constrained inventors would not pay the renewal fees “the rates 
of renewal of patents in the nineteenth century almost certainly under-represent both the value of 
patent rights and the economic significance of invention” (p.561). On the other hand, because 
markets for invention existed in Britain at this time (Nicholas, 2011), as they also did in the 
United States in the late nineteenth century (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999) and indeed in the 
modern era (Serrano, 2010), inventors could have secured external funds for the payment of 
renewal fees, or sold their patent rights. We believe examining renewed patents enhances the 
signal-to-noise ratio analogously  to the use of patent citations (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 
2005). In order to negate the effect of patent law changes, we restricted our data collection to the 
period between the 1852 and 1883 Patent Acts, during which the renewal fees remained constant. 
We identified 20,542 patents granted from 1853 to 1880 that paid a £50 renewal fee due by the 
end of the third year of the patent life.
28 Between 26 and 33 percent of patents were renewed 
during this time (Figure 7). 
 
4. Main Empirical Specifications 
We address two main issues in our empirics. First, we examine the number of individuals 
entering machinery or implements into each of the award categories in order to determine how 
competitive the contests were. Second, we examine the pattern of patenting and patent renewals 
within technology categories in order to determine the effect of prize awards on innovation.  
Our main entrant estimating equation is specified below. Given that the variable for the 
number of individuals entering into a competition takes on nonnegative integer count values and 
there is evidence of over-dispersion in the data, we use negative binomial regressions predicting 
the number of individual entrants in technology category j at time t, conditional on the awards. 
Our main variables are the sum of announced monetary prizes (in constant sterling pounds using 
the CPI) and announced medals that were scheduled at time t-1 to be awarded at time t for 
categories j=1,...,12 and time periods t=1839,...,1939. We include technology category ( j c ) and 
                                                 
28 We restrict the analysis to those patents that paid the first renewal fee. A second fee of £100 was due at year 
seven, but using this information would have restricted our sample too severely. Since the first fee was due at the 
end of year three of the patent life, and the new Act came into force in 1883, our data collection stopped in 1880. 16 
 
year ( t τ ) fixed effects and linear and quadratic technology category time trends to control for 
unobserved entry propensities that are correlated with the prizes. Identification  comes from 
within technology category changes over time:  
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The variation of prize awards by priority areas suggests also that the RASE may have been 
able to influence aggregate innovation as well as entry. Testing for this possibility using the 
patent and renewal data requires an understanding of the propensity to patent and the timing of 
inventions. Our identification strategy requires that inventors used the patent system and that 
they responded to the prize incentives offered by the RASE.
29  
In terms of the propensity  to patent, Table 1 shows that only around one-sixth of the 
innovations entered into the RASE competitions were patented (2,682 patents out of 15,032 
entries), but note that the total number of patents (i.e., those registered by RASE entrants and all 
other members of the public) in the technology categories that we use in our regressions was 
only 40,944. Therefore, the decision of RASE entrants to patent should be detectable in our 
dataset of all patents, especially if inventors active in the agricultural sector responded to the 
signal of the prizes, even though they may not have travelled to and entered the competitions.  
An examination of the timing of patents for entrants is reported in Figure 8.
30 For each prize 
entry that was patented, we plot the distribution of patenting years by their application date 
relative to the year in which the invention was exhibited. Patents are clearly clustered around the 
year in which the innovation was entered for a prize at the annual RASE show, although the 
distribution is less concentrated temporally for winners than non-winners.
31 Importantly, for our 
                                                 
29 Since we are observing patenting within a single industry, our estimates are less likely to be confounded by the 
industry-specific patent disclosure trade-offs noted by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) and Moser (2007). 
30 As for timing, even significant innovations had relatively short gestation periods. For example, Cyrus McCormick 
only started to improve on his father’s reaper design at the start of the 1831 harvest but by the end of it he had an 
operational machine. His first patent was granted on June 21st, 1834. Moreover, the RASE frequently offered prizes 
for cumulative improvements on innovations, which could have feasibly been developed in time for the 
competitions. For example, the prize schedule for a gold medal award in 1876 reads: “Gold medal of the Society to 
be awarded for an efficient sheaf binding machine attached to a reaper or otherwise.” Reapers were used for 
harvesting grain crops, but collecting the sheaves and binding them was labor intensive. 
31 We would expect to see a larger increase in post-show patenting by winners if a prize signaled that an invention 
were of high quality, since it would be more worthwhile to protect the value of the intellectual property right. As 
shown in Figure 8, we would also expect to see pre-show patenting if inventors preemptively patented given the lead 
times for the prize competitions, or if they were improving existing patented inventions in preparation for the shows. 17 
 
purposes, the data for both winner patents and non-winner patents exhibit peaks in the year of the 
show in which they competed. Thus, 29 percent of non-winning entrant inventions and 16 
percent of winning entrant inventions were patented with application dates at time t=0. It is this 
spike that allows us to isolate an effect of prizes on overall contemporaneous patenting.
32  
Our main patent equation below is structured similarly to the entrant equation above. The 
dependent variable is a count of granted patents in technology category j at time t (i.e., the show 
year), or for the period 1853 to 1880, a count of patents in category j filed at time t where 
inventors later paid the first renewal fee of £50 on their patents at time t+3. The mean count 
varies according to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary awards announced by the RASE at time t-1 
and scheduled to be awarded at time t. Again, we use technology category and year fixed effects 
and linear and quadratic technology category time trends. 
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5. Main Results 
5.1 Entrants 
In Table 2 we report our estimates of the entrant equation. Panel A runs the regressions 
using the whole sample from 1839 to 1939. Panel B restricts the time period to be between major 
patent laws (1853 to 1880) in order to provide estimates that can be compared to the patent and 
patent renewal specifications in Tables 3 and 4. Panel C restricts the regressions to the years 
between 1856 and 1872, when the RASE’s triennial system of prize rotations operated.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, Table 2 reveal the effects of monetary and medal awards on 
entrant counts. The parameters on the logarithm of total monetary awards are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. A doubling of monetary prizes implies a γln2×100 = 7 percent 
increase in entrants and each additional medal announced in the prize schedule increases the 
expected entrant count by [exp(γ)-1]×100 = 12  percent.  In  column 3, the coefficients on 
monetary and medal prizes remain stable when both variables are added simultaneously. The 
estimates in column 4 show evidence of large effects of enhanced prestige of the medal offered. 
Mean entrant counts increase by 53 percent for an additional gold medal announced in the prize 
schedule and by 9 percent for an additional silver medal. However, controlling for monetary 
                                                 
32 The linkage, by timing, between patenting and RASE prizes is further described in Appendix one. 18 
 
awards in column 5 reduces the size of the gold medal effect and the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant. Because the silver medal effect remains similar in columns 4 and 5, we 
attribute this finding to the RASE using  monetary awards as an additional inducement to 
inventors in areas where a gold medal was also announced.  
To the extent that the RASE partly funded the prizes from entrant fees, the amount of prizes 
offered, and thereby entrants, could be determined endogenously by a “budget size” effect. 
Therefore, in columns 6 to 8 we add a lagged variable for the total number of entrants into the 
prize competitions. We find that a count of total entrants in the previous year has a strong 
positive effect on entrants by technology category in the current year, but the size and statistical 
significance of our monetary and medal coefficients remain robust. We also find strong positive 
effects for gold and silver medals in column 7. This result holds when  controlling also for 
monetary awards in column 8.  
Given that the monetary prizes represented only around one-third of the projected sale price 
of inventions (Figure 2), one interpretation of our results would be that an award per se mattered 
as opposed to its pecuniary value. As a test, column 9 specifies the monetary prizes as variables 
measuring both the average monetary amount and the number of monetary prizes offered in the 
schedule.  A doubling in the number of awards, controlling for average value,  induces a 23 
percent increase in entrants, while higher value prizes, conditioning on the number of awards, are 
associated with a slightly lower level of entry. This suggests that monetary prizes scheduled to be 
awarded by the RASE were attractive irrespective of their value. Rather than  compensating 
inventors directly for the costs of research and development, the awards provided a “seal of 
quality” for inventors who could advertise this to potential buyers.  
Panel B reports results for the same regressions run for the period between 1853 and 1880. 
Compared to Panel A, we estimate a larger coefficient on total money prizes in column 1, but the 
medal coefficient is much smaller and it is statistically insignificant. Following the finding from 
Panel A, although the coefficient on the gold medal variable retains its statistical significance 
and  economic magnitude  in column 4, it is much smaller in size and loses its statistical 
significance when controlling for monetary awards. This is consistent with our previous 
contention that the  RASE  simultaneously used  prestige medal and monetary awards as 
inducements for innovation. In columns 6, 7 and 8 we exploit additional data and add variables 19 
 
measuring the count of total entrants and the number of attendees
33 in the previous year because 
the budget size effect described above may be a function of both entrant fees and ticket sale 
receipts. The addition of these variables does not substantively change the pattern of coefficients 
established in Panel A.  Finally,  we find similar evidence to Panel A with respect to the 
coefficients measuring the effect of the average monetary value and the number of monetary 
awards. That is, entrants appear to have been attracted to the RASE competitions because of the 
number of monetary prize awards rather than the monetary amount.   
In Panel C, during the period when the RASE used its triennial system of rotating prizes, the 
effect of monetary awards across the specifications is similar in size to the estimates in Panel B. 
And in column 9 the effect of the number of monetary prizes is very similar to the effect 
estimated in Panels A and B. By contrast, the effect of a gold medal on the number of entrants is 
much larger in Panel C. For example, the coefficient in column 4 implies a gold medal increased 
the number of entrants by 144 percent. Although the large and economically significant effect of 
the gold medal prizes is again not robust to the specification in column 5, large effects are 
estimated with the addition of the lagged total entrant and attendance variables in column 7 and 
when controlling also for monetary awards in column 8. This result is consistent with entrants 
being attracted into competition by the prospect of winning a prestigious medal, and it is also 
consistent with the prize rotation system providing a strong boost to the number of entrants 
because it gave inventors longer lead times to develop new technologies.    
In sum, estimates of the entrant equation are informative because they provide an insight 
into the attractiveness of the prizes. According to the theory of tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981), the prize system should have increased the average level of effort and performance by 
inventors, because awards were structured so that the largest prizes were awarded to the best 
inventions within each category. Overall, the results suggest that the prizes offered by the RASE 
induced competitive entry. We next turn to our patent and patent renewal estimates to test for 
output effects of the prizes announced in the schedule on the level of innovation. 
 
5.2 Patents and Patent Renewals 
Table  3  reports results of  the patent specifications. Because  the prizes variables are 
announced in the schedule at time t-1 and awarded at time t, we are testing for an immediate 
                                                 
33 Attendance statistics are only available from 1853. 20 
 
effect of the prize awards on patenting activity. We use the same time periods as our entrant 
regressions:  from 1839 to 1939; the period between major patent laws (1853 to 1880), when the 
cost of acquiring a patent remained constant; and the prize rotation period (1856 to 1872), when 
both the cost of acquiring a patent remained constant  and  prizes in the schedule were set 
according to the strict triennial system. If the RASE could potentially schedule prizes to be 
awarded in “hot” technology categories, then our estimates from the non-rotation periods should 
be biased upwards assuming that the incentive effects of the prizes remained constant over time. 
If, however, the incentive effects changed over time, (for example, the informational role of 
prizes may have diminished as communications advances created more efficient information 
exchange) then the coefficients across the major time periods may not be reliably compared. 
These biases imply that our estimates from the rotation period should be the most reliable. 
A first point to note from Panels A and B of Table 3 is the statistical insignificance of the 
prize variables. Both the effect of patenting with respect to money prizes and the effect of a 
medal on patent counts are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The coefficients on the gold 
and silver medals are imprecisely estimated (columns 3 and 4), as are those on the average, and 
number, of monetary prizes (column 6). Panel C provides stronger evidence of a link between 
the prizes and patents during the rotation period. In column 1, the logarithm of total monetary 
prizes enters positively and significantly, but a doubling of monetary awards increases patents by 
less than 1 percent. The effect of medals on patents is economically larger in column 2, with an 
additional medal implying an 8 percent increase in patents and a gold medal a 12 to 16 percent 
increase in patents based on the estimates in columns 4 and 5. The coefficients on both the 
average, and number, of monetary awards are imprecisely estimated.    
Going beyond the results based on raw patent counts, in Table 4 we control for the quality 
of patented inventions using only counts of patents that were renewed by the British Patent 
Office. Recall that these are patents for which an inventor would have needed to pay a £50 
renewal fee due by the end of the third year to keep the patent in force. In Panel A, all the 
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero for the period 1853 to 1880, but several 
clear the customary thresholds for statistical significance in Panel B when we exploit rotating 
prizes for the show years between 1856 and 1872. For these years, we assume that prize cycles 
would have been independent of invention cycles, so the effect of the prizes on patents is less 
likely to be confounded by supply or demand shocks in “hot” technology areas. The strongest 21 
 
effects of the prizes are those estimated in relation to variables measuring medals. In column 2, 
we find that an additional medal equates to an 18 percent increase in renewed patents and in 
column 4, an additional gold medal implies a 23 percent increase. Although both estimates are 
sensitive to controlling for monetary awards in columns 3 and 5, as we also found in our entrant 
regressions, overall the estimates from Panel C of Table 3 and Panel B of Table 4 suggest that 
non-pecuniary prizes in the RASE schedule were more effective in generating innovation in the 
target areas than were monetary awards. 
 
6. Testing for Displacement Effects 
One interpretation of the entrant and patent results is that the prizes encouraged competitive 
entry and innovation. But an important issue is the extent to which the prizes induced an increase 
in aggregate innovation or simply a reallocation of inventive effort from non-prize areas to prize 
areas. If inventors switched technology categories as a consequence of the prizes, then the effect 
we have identified so far may be coming from the displacement of inventions that would have 
occurred in other categories.  Substitution of effort across technologies  may have been 
particularly strong in the prize rotation period when inventors were given longer lead times. In 
order to test for the re-direction of existing inventive activity,  we examine patterns of 
substitution by inventors whom we observe repeatedly. We then further check the robustness of 
our patent and patent renewal regression results in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on repeat contest entrants and inventors patenting 
agricultural inventions in our data. Of the 705 individuals who entered the RASE competitions 
between 1856 and 1872, we find that 454 entered into competition at least twice and of these 95 
switched from the technology category in which we first observe them entering. Among all 
entrants, the rate of repeating is high for prize winners relative to non-winners, which might be 
expected if prize winners were more capable inventors. Of repeat entrants who also won a prize, 
we observe 47 percent switching technology categories, compared to 15 percent of entrants who 
did not win a prize. We also generate the same statistics for inventors we observe patenting 
agricultural technologies regardless of whether we also observe these individuals entering RASE 
prize competitions.  We find that 67 percent of entrants who patented switched from  the 
technology category we first observe them patenting, as compared to 50 percent of inventors 
who did not enter RASE competitions.  22 
 
Placing more quantitative structure on the data, we estimate conditional fixed effects logistic 
regressions. We define a dependent variable coded 1 for a switch of technology category by an 
entrant or inventor patenting at time t and 0 if the technology category remained the same. Some 
individuals switched more than once over the period, in which case we classify a switch as 1 if 
the activity in year t was in a different technology category from the first observed category for 
each inventor  and 0 otherwise. Our independent variables  are monetary and medal prizes 
announced in time t-1 and scheduled to be awarded in time t. With a logistic function Λ[.] and 
conditional  individual fixed effects ( i φ ),  we  are  identifying  off  the  within entrant/inventor 
variation in switching in relation to the prizes. For this reason we run the regressions on the 
sample of repeat and switch inventors in Table 5 for whom we observe variation over time.
34   
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Table 6 presents the exponent value of the coefficients, or odds ratios, for all entrants in 
columns 1 to 5 and we also use a dummy variable identifying prize winners relative to non-
winners interacted with the prizes variables in columns 6 to 10 to test for differential effects. Z-
statistics test the null hypothesis that the odds ratios are equal to unity.  
In columns 1 to 4, the odds ratios are statistically indistinguishable from unity with respect 
to medal and monetary prizes, so these variables have little estimated impact on the odds of an 
entrant switching  their technology category.  In column 5 the effect of monetary prizes is 
statistically significant, but the odds ratio implies that entrants were less likely to switch into 
areas that had higher monetary awards. Although the point estimates imply that switching by 
entrants in RASE prize competitions is positively related to prestigious non-pecuniary awards 
(which also happen to have the largest effect in our patent and patent renewal regressions in 
Table 3 and 4) the confidence intervals around these point estimates include a “no effect” odds 
ratio of one. Furthermore,  the interaction effects in columns 6 to 10 are also statistically 
insignificant and tests also fail to reject that the odds ratio for the main effect for prize winners is 
                                                 
34 In these specifications we do not use year dummy controls or controls for time trends because the conditional 
maximum likelihood estimate of the logistic function fails to converge. This is driven by the fact that for some 
individuals a combination of the year dummies and the prizes variables perfectly predict switching. 23 
 
equal to unity.
35 Based on these results, reallocation of inventive effort from non-prize areas to 
prize areas cannot explain the boost to inventive activity that we observe. 
Extending the analysis of displacement further, Table 7 runs specifications using patent 
category switching for all inventors patenting, while the interaction effects estimate the 
differential effect for inventors who patented and entered into the RASE prize competitions 
relative to those who patented but did not enter. Again the odds ratios on the prizes variables, in 
both main and interacted form, are statistically indistinguishable from unity, implying that the 
prizes had no impact on the odds of switching. Because both sets of inventors – entrants into the 
prize competitions and non-entrants – contribute to the patents that we use in the patent and 
patent renewal regressions in Tables 3 and 4, this finding suggests that the effect of the prizes on 
patenting we identified in section 5.2 is not confounded by technology category switching.  
Finally, in Table 8 we test for an effect of the prizes on aggregate inventive activity by 
running the patent and patent renewal regressions on only  non-entrants into the RASE 
competitions who also patented in agricultural related areas. Specifically, we re-estimate the 
effects of medal and monetary prizes from Panel C of Table 3 and Panel B of Table 4. In column 
2 of Panel A, Table 8 we find that the coefficient on medals is very similar in size to the 
comparable coefficient in column 2, Panel C of Table 3, while the effect of a gold medal on 
patenting  is  slightly  larger  in Table 8 compared to the effect estimated in the respective 
specifications in Table 3. In the patent renewal regressions in Panel B of Table 8, the findings are 
broadly similar. Although the coefficient on medals in column 2 is statistically insignificant, it is 
of a similar economic magnitude to the coefficient in column 2, Panel B of Table 4. A gold 
medal increases expected renewed patents by 36 percent according to the estimate in column 4, 
versus 23 percent in column 4, Panel B of Table 4 and the estimate in Table 8 is also robust to 
controlling for monetary awards (column 5). One explanation for this finding is that the prize 
schedule signaled to these inventors potentially profitable areas of technological development, 
and this signaling function is consistent with qualitative evidence showing that the RASE was a 
                                                 
35 In a fixed effects specification the constant within group dummy variable identifying the main effect for prize 
winners drops out of the estimation. But it can be derived from the odds ratios presented in Table 6. Thus, in column 
6, the odds ratio on the variable measuring total monetary prizes (i.e., 0.979) measures the main effect for non-
winners whereas the odds ratio on the interaction term (i.e., 0.952) measures the differential effect for winners. In a 
linear model the total effect is obtained by summing the coefficients, which corresponds to multiplying the odds 
ratios here since they are in logarithmic form. Thus, the total effect for winners in column 6 is 0.979 × 0.952 = 0.932 
with a z-statistic of -1.54. Repeating this exercise across all our interaction specifications in Table 6, the total effect 
in terms of odds ratios for winners is not significantly different from unity at the customary significance level. 24 
 
powerful, prestigious and influential scientific society. The inducement prizes offered by the 
RASE had an important effect on aggregate innovative activity and insofar as we are able to rule 
out confounding influences due to technology category switching, this effect cannot be explained 
by the re-direction of existing inventive effort. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have examined one of  the longest available datasets  of awards for innovation to 
determine  whether  prizes spurred  technological development. We find that prizes induced 
competitive entry and that the largest effects are for prestigious medals.  Consistent with 
competitive entry, we find important effects of the prizes on counts of quality-adjusted patents, 
which cannot be explained by technology category substitution. Our quantitative evidence on the 
utility of prizes is supported qualitatively. The Scientific American remarked of the RASE prize 
system in 1867: “It is indisputable that these competitive trials have done, and are doing, much to 
raise agricultural engineering to the highest standards of efficiency and economy.” With respect 
to steam engines, which had the largest impact on productivity growth of any technology in the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century (Crafts, 2004), the role of the RASE was again noted by the 
Scientific American in 1874: “An investigation of the results obtained from year to year shows a 
most extraordinary improvement in the engines, as regards economy and workmanship, and there 
is little doubt that the effect of these tests has been most beneficial to the users of steam power.” 
An 1864 report by the Society of Arts noted: “Without the prize system the manufacturers would 
not have been guided to the production of the class of implements really required.” 
Equally, we are aware of caveats to our findings. We cannot determine how much of the 
boost to patents we observe is driven by shifts in the propensity to patent as inventors sought to 
avoid expropriation risk as a consequence of the RASE offering prizes and attracting inventors to 
the technology target areas. Furthermore, despite our best efforts to measure  the effects of 
technology category switching, it is possible that some inventors may have strategically delayed 
technological development to  synchronize their inventive efforts with the prizes, especially 
during the triennial rotation period when the technology categories eligible for awards could be 
predicted. This form of temporal substitution would upward bias our results if inventors delayed 
patenting to maximize the use of the patent term to engage in supracompetitive pricing arising 
from the advertising value of the prizes. The effects we observe may also be downward biased. 25 
 
We do not observe unpatented inventions that may also have been stimulated by the prizes, and 
our estimates do not include patents induced by the prizes that were filed in years other than the 
show year. If prize-induced patented or unpatented inventions generated sequences of cumulative 
innovations, then the downward bias in our estimates will be large.    
Our  historical  evidence on RASE prizes offers  guidance for the design of current 
inducement prize contests. Mega  prizes,  such as those offered by the  X-Prize  Foundation, 
presuppose that inventors are incentivized by large pecuniary inducements, but R&D costs 
typically exceed the value of the prize. For example, 26 teams competed for the X-Prize for 
suborbital spaceflight and collectively spent in excess of $100 million for a ten million dollar 
prize. Our evidence suggests that non-pecuniary prizes can be particularly effective. They avoid 
the complex process of linking the magnitude of the prize to the value of a particular technology 
and inventors are still able to appropriate by winning. The RASE contests offered free publicity 
and public approbation. Inventors could benefit from the seal of quality ascribed to the invention 
when selling or licensing their technologies. The RASE lowered administrative costs by using 
medals rather than financial awards.  
One explanation for why the financial awards to inventors were relatively small (around 
one-third of the sale value of an invention according to Figure 2) is that the RASE prizes were 
complementary to patents. Intellectual property rights provided incentives for inventors to invest 
in  useful  knowledge because they could appropriate through proprietary pricing, which was 
augmented by the effects of the prizes. Although this means that the prizes may have magnified 
deadweight losses, they also realized benefits that the patent system could not. In particular, 
prizes facilitated the diffusion of technical information further than the disclosures required by 
patenting.  Our  evidence suggests that in agricultural technologies, the prizes encouraged 
innovation beyond the patent system alone.  
Given the imperfections associated with patents, the literature on innovation incentives has 
attempted to evaluate the use of alternative, or complementary, mechanisms such as prizes. The 
theoretical literature is well-developed in this area, but empirical work has been lacking. This is 
particularly problematic because uncertainty about the cost-benefit tradeoff associated with 
prizes acts as a major barrier to changing innovation promoting policies (Kremer, 1998, pp. 
1162-1165; NRC, 2007). Insofar as policy changes require supporting empirical evidence, our 
findings suggest that inducement prizes for innovation can work.   26 
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Appendix one. Between 1853 and 1880 –  the period for which we run our patent renewal fee 
specifications (Table 4) – patenting an invention in Britain involved the following procedure.  
Stage 1 An inventor filed an application with the Patent Office, which was then examined by the Law 
Officers of the Crown (i.e., the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General). This application could be 
either  a “complete specification” of the invention or a “provisional specification”. Provisional 
specifications allowed inventors to claim for priority on their invention even if it was incomplete at this 
point in time. If a provisional specification was filed, then a complete specification of the invention was 
required by the Patent Office within 6 months of the application date. 
Stage 2 The complete specification was published after the patent had been officially sealed (granted), 
a process that took 3 to 15 months from the date of the application. The cost of filing for a patent was £25 
with £150 payable in renewal fees to keep the patent in force for a full term of 14 years.  
Stage 3 Renewal fees were payable in two installments: £50 by the end of the third year from the 
application date and £100 by the end of the seventh year. 
   
A simplified version of this procedure is outlined below for an inventor who applies for a patent on 
their invention in the year the prize competition takes place at the RASE show (i.e., a year after the prize 
schedule is announced). It illustrates how we link counts of patents by their application date with the 
timing of the prize schedule announcement and the prize competitions at the shows. With respect to our 
econometrics, Table 4 presents results where we test for a boost in patenting in year t, for all patents 
(columns 1 to 4) and for patents filed in time t where the inventor subsequently paid the renewal fee in 
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Appendix two. We organized our entrant and prize winner data into the following technology categories, 
where we have 12 main categories codifying 130 sub-categories. Each sub-category reflects a technology 
area we identified in the description of an entrant or prize winner invention.  
 
Table A2. Technology categories. 
 
MAIN CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY MAIN CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY
Planting Machinery dibbling machine Dairy international dairy
drill, also seed sowers working dairy
drill presser milking machine
hand seed-dibble milk-tester
hand-barrow drill dairies suitable for butter and cheese
horse seed dibbler dairy implements and machinery
cream separator
Miscellaneous Implements miscellaneous implements butter makers
butter packages, also egg packages
Cultivating Implements powder sprayers butter machinery
scarifiers or grubbers butter-drying machine









couch rake Other agricultural machinery
combined guard & feeder
Harvesting Machinery mowers and reapers corpolite mills
potato diggers & sorters cottage grates or stoves
root lifter, also thinner cottage range
sheaf-binding machine bricks drain-tile or pipe-machine
side delivery rakes draining tool
horse (or tractor) rake dynamometer
swath turners field gates, fencing, folds, latches, pens
hay maker fire engine
grass mowers hand pulling machine
harness
Grain Processing Machines threshing/thrashing machine horse engines and machinery
winnowing machine horse gear also pony gears
straw trussers, also tedders, binders & presses machinery in motion
barley hummellers model of rick-yard
chaff cutter movable huts
hand corn mill plans & models, also samples, specimens
grinding mill poultry production
grist mills seed drawers
hand-dressing machine seeds
hand-power machine sheep dipping apparatus
finishing machine sheep shearing machine
straw elevator with horse power thatch-making machine
straw elevators with a threshing machin weighing machine
corn cleaner washing machines, mangles, wringers
corn or flour dressing machine pumps
corn screen sack hoists, holders, lifters, barrows
corn and cake crusher or bruiser stone breakers, rock drills, stone mills 
combined portable threshing & finishing grindstone stuff
combined stacking machine
Engines light portable motors
Non-Grain Processing  paring & coring machine water-lifting engine
Machines mills steam-engines
root pulper simple portable agricultural engine
root steamer fixed steam engines
linseed crusher compound portable agricultural engine
meal mill steam cultivation
cider-making plant steam plough
root cutters traction engines
cake bruisers engines, boilers
cake breaker















Appendix three. We used the technology categories specified in Appendix two to establish a set of 
keywords, which we subsequently used to identify patents granted in these areas between 1839 and 1939. 
While patents were organized by the Patent Office according to a classification system, we were unable to 
develop a concordance because the classification changed over time and our technology categories are 
finely graded and overlap with the broader subject arrangements available.  
Our method is based on Bennet Woodcroft’s Subject-Matter Index (Made from Titles Only) of Patents 
of Invention, 1617-1852 (British Patent Office, 1854). Thus we took our keywords and searched for 
matches in the titles of patents in our database. For example, to identify patents in the first sub-category in 
Table A1 for dibbling machines (machines used to get seed into the ground) we used the keywords 
“dibbling” “dibble” and “dibbles”.  
We report in Table A3 descriptive statistics on the patents we identified in each category that were 
used in our regression. We could not develop keywords for “Miscellaneous Implements” and 
“Miscellaneous” in Table A2 and these categories are also excluded from our regressions. In Figure A3 
we show a comparison of the patent counts for our keyword method and those in the subject series 
published by the Patent Office. Our example is for the time period 1909-1913 when “Harvesting 
Appliances” happened to be specified in the classification of published complete specifications. We 
matched these data up to our main category of “Harvesting Machinery”.  
 
 
Table A3. Summary statistics. 
 
Notes: Figures are the mean patent counts in each category in each year, with 
standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Main Category  Patents, 1839-1939
Patents, 1853-1880
Renewal Fee Paid
Planting Machinery 1.18 0.29
(1.85) (0.49)
Cultivating Implements 70.70 8.91
(62.58) (2.12)
Harvesting Machinery 28.02 6.67
(14.35) (3.65)
Grain Processing Machines 53.43 14.20
(25.38) (7.28)













Figure A3. Comparing “Harvesting” patents identified using keywords with 
“Harvesting” patents in the subject classification. 
            
Notes: Figures are patent counts identified by keyword for 1909-1913 for our 
category “Harvesting Machinery” and patent counts in the category 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Notes: There were no shows in 1917 and 1918 due to the First World War and in 1866 due to cattle 
plague. Statistics for all shows other than: attendance where statistics are for shows 1853-1939; 
implements exhibited where statistics are from 1839-1927. Prize competitions statistics are for 91 shows 
where prizes were announced the year prior to the show and where data were available. The schedule of 
prizes announced is missing for years 1845, 1851 (due to the Crystal Palace Exhibition), 1854, 1857, 
1862, 1925, and 1939. Monetary values expressed in constant prices using the CPI where 1871=100. We 
spliced the Rousseau price index (1830-45) onto the Sauerbeck price index (1846-1938); both series are 
taken from Mitchell and Deane (1962). As the series stops in 1938, we used the 1938 value of the index 
for 1939. Inventions patented are for all patent applications that were sealed (i.e., granted). 
   
Mean St. Dev Min Max Total
Shows
Duration of Show (days) 4.57 1.20 1 10 448
Attendance 105,083 43,140 23,978 217,980 8,826,955
Implement Stands 335 134 12 704 32,518
Implements Exhibited 4,294 2,140 54 11,878 364,975
Prize Contests
Monetary Prizes Announced (₤) 50.16 85.11 0 665 17,908
Monetary Prizes Awarded (₤) 30.35 66.87 0 648 13,295
Medals Announced 0.63 0.94 0 10 224
Gold 0.04 0.21 0 1 16
Silver 0.57 0.90 0 10 205
Bronze 0.01 0.12 0 2 3
Medals Awarded 1.17 1.18 0 8 511
Gold 0.03 0.17 0 1 13
Silver 1.14 1.16 0 8 498
Bronze 0 0 0 0 0
Winning Inventions (n=1,986)
Inventions Patented 0.22 0.41 0 1 432
Non-Winning Inventions (n=13,046)
Inventions Patented 0.17 0.38 0 1 2,25035 
 
Table 2. Contest entrant regression results. 
 
Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of the number of individuals entering 
machinery or implements in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. The attendance 
variable is from RASE reports showing the number of visitors to each show (available from 1853). All 
monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by 
technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels.  
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
(log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.084*** 0.080***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.017] [0.019]
Medalsjt-1 0.115** 0.092*** 0.110***
[0.045] [0.028] [0.033]
Gold Medaljt-1 0.426** 0.196 0.665*** 0.512**
[0.194] [0.178] [0.200] [0.203]
Silver Medaljt-1 0.083** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.076***
[0.035] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028]
(log) Entrantst-1 0.539*** 0.525*** 0.536***
[0.053] [0.047] [0.051]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 -0.051**
[0.022]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 0.332***
[0.041]
Observations 983 983 983 983 983 897 897 897 983
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 0.143***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.024] [0.024]
Medalsjt-1 0.041 0.011 0.005
[0.055] [0.015] [0.019]
Gold Medaljt-1 0.495** 0.006 0.591** 0.178
[0.197] [0.091] [0.245] [0.177]
Silver Medaljt-1 -0.008 0.011 -0.020 -0.009
[0.027] [0.018] [0.020] [0.029]
(log) Entrantst-1 0.055 0.185** 0.069
[0.111] [0.090] [0.104]
(log) Attendancet-1 0.010 0.044 0.006
[0.064] [0.080] [0.070]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 -0.007
[0.064]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 0.316***
[0.068]
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 273 273 273 297
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.155*** 0.147***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.019] [0.023]
Medalsjt-1 -0.001 0.000 0.005
[0.039] [0.018] [0.021]
Gold Medaljt-1 0.894*** 0.104 1.232*** 0.635***
[0.188] [0.163] [0.071] [0.152]
Silver Medaljt-1 -0.031 -0.003 -0.025 -0.012
[0.034] [0.020] [0.018] [0.027]
(log) Entrantst-1 0.119 0.380*** 0.168
[0.116] [0.101] [0.107]
(log) Attendancet-1 0.113 0.200 0.120
[0.139] [0.200] [0.144]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 -0.001
[0.066]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 0.322***
[0.064]
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 163 163 163 175
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel A: Full Period, 1839-1939
Panel B: Period Between Major Patent Laws, 1853-1880
Panel C: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-187236 
 
Table 3. Patent regression results. 
 
Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of patents in technology category j at time t 
as the dependent variable. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in 
squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent 
and * 10 percent levels.    
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]




Gold Medaljt-1 0.018 0.017
[0.109] [0.111]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.019 0.018
[0.015] [0.015]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.016
[0.016]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.031
[0.024]
Observations 874 874 874 874 874 874
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Gold Medaljt-1 -0.015 -0.004
[0.041] [0.038]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.003 0.007
[0.102] [0.097]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.002
[0.022]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.010
[0.030]
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 269
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Gold Medaljt-1 0.148** 0.117**
[0.058] [0.054]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.039 0.028
[0.065] [0.065]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.019
[0.047]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.003
[0.085]
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel A: Full Period, 1839-1939
Panel B: Period Between Major Patent Laws, 1853-1880
Panel C: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-187237 
 
Table 4. Patent renewal regression results. 
 
Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of renewed patents in technology category j at 
time t as the dependent variable. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in 
squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 
10 percent levels. 
 
 
   
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]




Gold Medaljt-1 0.090 0.055
[0.061] [0.060]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.168 0.160
[0.158] [0.166]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.016
[0.027]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 0.004
[0.038]
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 269
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Gold Medaljt-1 0.203*** 0.139
[0.077] [0.086]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.144 0.125
[0.125] [0.137]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.058
[0.043]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.037
[0.076]
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel A: Between Patent Laws, 1853-1880
Panel B: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-187238 
 
Table 5. Repeat entrants and inventors patenting, 1856-1872. 
 
 
Notes: This table shows the number and percentage of repeat entrants into prize 
competitions and repeat inventors in the patent data whether they entered a prize 
competition or not. Switching is defined by whether the entering category or 
patenting category changes relative to the first time the entrant/inventor is observed 






Table 6. Odds of switching by entrants, 1856-1872. 
 
Notes: Odds ratios from conditional fixed effects logistic regressions with switching as the dependent variable coded 
1 if an entrant enters into a competition in a different technology category to that in which they are first observed 
and 0 if the category stays the same. Z-statistics in squared brackets test that the odds ratio is equal to unity. All 
monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. 
 








Entrants 705 454 [64.4] 95 [20.9]
    Prize Winners 103 87 [84.5] 41 [47.1]
    Non-Winners 602 367 [61.0] 54 [14.7]
Inventors Patenting 2,053 573 [27.9] 300 [52.4]
    Entrants 156 86 [55.1] 58 [67.4]
    Non-Entrants 1,897 487 [25.7] 242 [49.7]
Repeat Repeat and Switch
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
(log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.952 0.954 0.941* 0.979 0.982 0.968
[-1.42] [-1.37] [-1.68] [-0.40] [-0.35] [-0.59]
Medalsjt-1 1.071 1.064 1.079 1.075
[0.89] [0.80] [0.64] [0.61]
Gold Medaljt-1 1.500 1.975 1.761 2.052
[0.80] [1.27] [0.71] [0.85]
Silver Medalsjt-1 1.064 1.048 1.069 1.059
[0.79] [0.59] [0.56] [0.48]
Winnerijt x (log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.952 0.951 0.952
[-0.71] [-0.72] [-0.67]
Winnerijt x Medalsjt-1 0.988 0.984
[-0.07] [-0.11]
Winnerijt x Gold Medaljt-1 0.762 0.937
[-0.26] [-0.06]
Winnerijt x Silver Medalsjt-1 0.992 0.982
[-0.05] [-0.11]
Observations 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 9539 
 
Table 7. Odds of switching by inventors patenting, 1856-1872. 
 
Notes: Odds ratios from conditional fixed effects logistic regressions with switching as the dependent variable coded 
1 if an inventor patents in a different technology category to that in which they are first observed and 0 if the 
category stays the same. Z-statistics in squared brackets test that the odds ratio is equal to unity. All monetary 
amounts are deflated by the CPI. 
 
 
   
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
(log) Total Monetaryjt-1 0.972 0.971 0.972 0.966 0.967 0.967
[-1.20] [-1.23] [-1.18] [-1.35] [-1.28] [-1.26]
Medalsjt-1 1.015 1.063 0.896 0.945
[0.08] [0.31] [-0.49] [-0.25]
Gold Medaljt-1 0.837 0.916 0.809 0.905
[-0.45] [-0.22] [-0.47] [-0.22]
Silver Medalsjt-1 1.074 1.107 0.923 0.956
[0.33] [0.46] [-0.32] [-0.18]
Entrantijt x (log) Total Monetaryjt-1 1.039 1.025 1.029
[0.62] [0.40] [0.45]
Entrantijt x Medalsjt-1 1.730 1.662
[1.17] [1.06]
Entrantijt x Gold Medaljt-1 1.127 1.020
[0.13] [0.02]
Entrantijt x Silver Medalsjt-1 1.996 1.938
[1.28] [1.22]
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 30040 
 
Table 8. Robustness checks on patent and patent renewal regression results. 
 
Notes: Panels A and B replicate the specifications in Panel C of Table 3 and Panel B of Table 4 respectively, but 
only using patents or renewed patents by non-entrants into the prize competitions. Negative binomial regression 
coefficients with a count of renewed patents in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. All 
monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by technology 
category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]




Gold Medaljt-1 0.185*** 0.154**
[0.060] [0.064]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.014 0.001
[0.077] [0.080]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.022
[0.039]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.007
[0.071]
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Gold Medaljt-1 0.307*** 0.254*
[0.117] [0.140]
Silver Medalsjt-1 0.071 0.048
[0.145] [0.154]
(log) Average Monetaryjt-1 0.070
[0.056]
(log) Number Monetaryjt-1 -0.052
[0.093]
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1872 
(Dependent Variable: Renewed Patents by Non-Entrants)
Panel A: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1872 





Figure 1. The geographic distribution of shows and prize winners, 1839-1939. 
 
Notes: Show locations are given by large black circles, and prize winner 
addresses by small red circles. Geo-coded data points are for 1,814 of our 
prize winners.  
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Figure 2. Regression plot of prizes awarded  
against the projected sale price of the winning invention. 
 
Notes: Variables are specified in logs with an estimated beta of 0.34 (s.e. 
0.02). The projected sale price of the winning invention is obtained for 662 
observations  reported  in the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of 
England. In this sample of data, the mean sale value for a winning invention is 
£30.25 and the mean value for a monetary prize is £9.70.  
 
 
Figure 3. Entrants for prizes announced in harvesting machinery. 
 
Notes: Harvesting machinery category as specified in Appendix two. Solid 
circles represent gold medals in this prize contest category. They are for the 
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Figure 4. Monetary and medal awards announced in the prize schedule. 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the prize schedules announced in the year prior to 
the show. Monetary values expressed in constant sterling pounds using the 
CPI where 1871=100.  
 
 
Figure 5. Patents granted by the British Patent Office, 1839-1939. 
                 
Notes: Our series of patents was compiled using the COI and EPO datasets 
as described in the text, as well as our own data collection from the patent 
journals of the British Patent Office. 
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Figure 6. Patenting rates. 
 
Notes: Vertical lines are for major changes associated with the cost of 
obtaining a patent, namely 1852, 1883 and 1905 (Van Dulken, 1999, p. 24). 
Observations represent averages for each year for tabulations of inventions 
matched up to our database of granted patents. 
 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of patents paying the first renewal fee, 1853-80. 
 
Notes: Renewed patents are listed in the journals of the British Patent Office. Our 
data reflect all patents for which the first renewal fee of £50 was paid by the end 
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Figure 8. Histograms illustrating the timing of patents  
for winners and non-winners of prize awards, 1839-1939. 
 
               NON-WINNERS                  WINNERS 
 
Notes: Observations are calculated as patent application year minus the show year such that negative 
values reflect patents granted for inventions exhibited at the show that were applied for prior to the show 
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Patent Application Year Relative to Year of Show (t=0) 







01/10  January,  Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, and Greg Shaffer, “Mergers and 
Partial Ownership” 
 
02/10  January, Astrid Kunze and Kenneth R. Troske, “Life-cycle patterns in 
male/female differences in job search”. 
 
03/10  January,  Øystein Daljord and Lars Sørgard, “Single-Product versus Uniform 
SSNIPs”. 
 
04/10  January, Alexander W. Cappelen, James Konow, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil 
Tungodden, ”Just luck: an experimental study of risk taking and fairness”. 
 
05/10  February, Laurence Jacquet, “Optimal labor income taxation under maximin: 
an upper bound”. 
 
06/10  February, Ingvild Almås, Tarjei Havnes, and Magne Mogstad, “Baby 
booming inequality? Demographic change and inequality in Norway, 1967-
2004”. 
 
07/10  February, Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann, and Bruno van der Linden, 
“Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses”. 
 
08/10  February, Fred Schroyen, “Income risk aversion with quantity constraints”. 
 
09/10  March, Ingvild Almås and Magne Mogstad, “Older or Wealthier? The impact 
of age adjustment on cross-sectional inequality measures”. 
 
10/10  March, Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen, and Otto Toivanen, “Cartels Uncovered”. 
 
11/10  April, Karl Ove Aarbu, “Demand patterns for treatment insurance in 
Norway”. 
 
12/10  May, Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Under 
pressure?  The effect of peers on outcomes of young adults”. 
 
13/10  May, Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, “A chronology of 
financial crises for Norway”. 
  
14/10  May, Anders Bjørklund and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Education and family 
background: Mechanisms and policies”. 
 
15/10  July, Eva Benedicte D. Norman and Victor D. Norman, “Agglomeration, tax 
competition and local public goods supply”. 
 
16/10  July, Eva Benedicte D. Norman, “The price of decentralization”. 
 
17/10  July, Eva Benedicte D. Norman, “Public goods production and private sector 
productivity”. 
 
18/10  July, Kurt Richard Brekke, Tor Helge Holmås, and Odd Rune Straume, 
“Margins and Market Shares: Pharmacy Incentives for Generic Substitution”. 
 
19/10  August, Karl Ove Aarbu, “Asymmetric information – evidence from the home 
insurance market”. 
 
20/10  August. Roger Bivand, “Computing the Jacobian in spatial models: an applied 
survey”. 
 
21/10  August, Sturla Furunes Kvamsdal, “An overview of Empirical Analysis of 
behavior of fishermen facing new regulations. 
 
22/10  September, Torbjørn Hægeland, Lars Johannessen Kirkebøen, Odbjørn 
Raaum, and Kjell G. Salvanes, ” Why children of college graduates 
outperform their schoolmates: A study of cousins and adoptees”. 
 
23/10  September, Agnar Sandmo, “Atmospheric Externalities and Environmental 
Taxation”. 
 
24/10  October, Kjell G. Salvanes, Katrine Løken, and Pedro Carneiro, “A flying 
start? Long term consequences of maternal time investments in children 
during their first year of life”.  
 
25/10  September, Roger Bivand, “Exploiting Parallelization in Spatial Statistics: an 
Applied Survey using R”. 
 
26/10  September, Roger Bivand, “Comparing estimation methods for spatial 
econometrics techniques using R”. 
 
27/10  October. Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen, and Lars Sørgard, “Merger 
simulations with observed diversion ratios.” 
 
28/10  November, Alexander W. Cappelen, Knut Nygaard, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and 
Bertil Tungodden, “Efficiency, equality and reciprocity in social preferences: 
A comparison of students and a representative population”. 
  
29/10  December, Magne Krogstad Asphjell, Wilko Letterie, Øivind A. Nilsen, and 






01/11  January,  Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden, 
“Human and financial capital for microenterprise development: Evidence 
from a field and lab experiment.” 
 
02/11  February, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Quality 
competition with profit constraints: do non-profit firms provide higher quality 
than for-profit firms?” 
 
03/11  February, Gernot Doppelhofer and Melvyn Weeks, “Robust Growth 
Determinants”. 
 
04/11  February, Manudeep Bhuller, Magne Mogstad, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Life-
Cycle Bias and the Returns to Schooling in Current and Lifetime Earnings”. 
 
05/11  March, Knut Nygaard, "Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway". 
 
06/11  March, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y., “Negotiation under possible third party 
settlement”. 
 
07/11  April, Fred Schroyen, “Attitudes towards income risk in the presence of 
quantity constraints”. 
 
08/11  April, Craig Brett and Laurence Jacquet, “Workforce or Workfare?” 
 
09/11  May, Bjørn Basberg, “A Crisis that Never Came. The Decline of the European 
Antarctic Whaling Industry in the 1950s and -60s”. 
 
10/11  June, Joseph A. Clougherty, Klaus Gugler, and Lars Sørgard, “Cross-Border 
Mergers and Domestic Wages: Integrating Positive ‘Spillover’ Effects and 
Negative ‘Bargaining’ Effects”. 
 
11/11  July, Øivind A. Nilsen, Arvid Raknerud, and Terje Skjerpen, “Using the 
Helmert-transformation to reduce dimensionality in a mixed model: 
Application to a wage equation with worker and …rm heterogeneity”. 
 
12/11  July, Karin Monstad, Carol Propper, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Is teenage 
motherhood contagious? Evidence from a Natural Experiment”. 
 
13/11  August, Kurt R. Brekke, Rosella Levaggi, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune 
Straume, “Patient Mobility, Health Care Quality and Welfare”. 
 
14/11  July, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y.,  “Fairness motivation in bargaining”. 
  
15/11  September, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y, Alexander Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, 
and Bertil Tungodden, “Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social 
preferences among prisoners”. 
 
16/11  September, Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup, and Frank Stähler, 
“Newspaper Differentiation and Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax 
Policy”. 
 
17/11  Gregory Corcos, Massimo Del Gatto, Giordano Mion, and Gianmarco I.P. 
Ottaviano, “Productivity and Firm Selection: Quantifying the "New" Gains 
from Trade”. 
 
18/11  Grant R. McDermott and Øivind Anti Nilsen, “Electricity Prices, River 
Temperatures and Cooling Water Scarcity”. 
 
19/11  Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market”. 
 
20/11  Liam Brunt, “Property rights and economic growth: evidence from a natural 
experiment”. 
 
21/11  Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market: proofs”. 
 
22/11  Roger Bivand, “After “Raising the Bar”: applied maximum likelihood 
estimation of families of models in spatial econometrics”. 
 
23/11  Roger Bivand, “Geocomputation and open source software:components and 
software stacks”. 
 
24/11  Simon P.Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Martin Peitz, “Media 
market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices”. 
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